Artificial Intelligence · 05.08.2026, 10:39 UTC
Moral Hazard in Multi-Agent Language Models
| Schweregrad | info |
|---|---|
| Kategorie | Artificial Intelligence |
| Quelle | arXiv cs.AI ↗ |
| Veröffentlicht | 05.08.2026 UTC |
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arXiv:2607.23982v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Cooperation can fail when socially valuable effort is costly, weakly observable, and mainly benefits others. Drawing on Holmstr\"om's team moral-hazard model, we introduce the Dialogue Moral Hazard Game, a controlled textual game that operationalizes this hidden-action structure for language agents. In each episode, an agent can preserve an immediate local reward or pay a query cost to reveal a hidden safety fact that primarily helps another agent's downstream decision. We evaluate nine open-weight language models and one frontier API model, decomposing behavior into query use, realized information transfer, local-reward preservation, unsafe choice, format validity, and team success. Base open-weight models commonly preserve local reward without team success or query without communicating information that changes the final decision. GPT-5.6 Sol reaches ceiling behavior in the primary setting, and autonomous sweeps respond strongly to query cost and team reward. In a 3,015-decision incentive-isolation experiment with scripted partners, its empirical query threshold tracks the Holmstr\"om-derived private-share boundary across nine query costs with mean absolute error 0.013. We then use supervised fine-tuning, RLOO, sequential SFT+RLOO, and GEPA prompt optimization as diagnostic update mechanisms where coverage permits. Their effects are heterogeneous: SmolLM3-3B and OLMo-7B show the clearest mechanism-consistent weight-level improvements, whereas GEPA sometimes improves team success while reducing or eliminating …