Artificial Intelligence · 07.08.2026, 05:39 UTC
OpenAI Privacy Filter: A Cross-Lingual, Cross-Domain PII Evaluation Across 32 Benchmarks
| Schweregrad | info |
|---|---|
| Kategorie | Artificial Intelligence |
| Quelle | arXiv cs.CL ↗ |
| Veröffentlicht | 07.08.2026 UTC |
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arXiv:2608.02616v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We present what is, to our knowledge, the first systematic evaluation of OpenAI's Privacy Filter (OPF), a 1.5B-parameter model that converts an autoregressive language model into a bidirectional PII detector, across 32 benchmarks spanning 14 languages and 5 domains. Our most practically actionable finding is a domain-dependent labeled-data crossover: fine-tuned XLM-RoBERTa surpasses OPF's zero-shot performance with only ~500 labeled examples on English synthetic PII (~100 on non-English Kiji), and ~1000 on synthetic medical PII. Crucially, per-class fine-tuning (17 PII entity types, a subset of OPF's 33) is less data-efficient than binary labels at small n -- at n=100, binary F1=0.634 vs. per-class 0.360. Zero-shot, OPF achieves F1=0.464 on the SPY medical benchmark and F1=0.855 on AI4Privacy, substantially outperforming Presidio and XLM-RoBERTa-large-NER. However, OPF degrades sharply outside its PII training distribution: F1=0.04--0.40 on general NER benchmarks and collapses for non-Latin scripts (Arabic: 0.04, Cyrillic: 0.03). Error analysis reveals OPF excels on structurally regular PII (email: 0.78, phone: 0.76) but struggles with culturally variable entities (person names: 0.40, addresses: 0.49), and is recall-biased across most PII domains (precision 0.31--0.54, recall 0.70--0.85). We provide a decision heuristic for when to use OPF zero-shot, when to fine-tune XLM-RoBERTa, and which language families to avoid.