Artificial Intelligence · 25.08.2026, 12:16 UTC
SkillBloat: Token Amplification Attacks via Skill Injection in LLM Coding Agents
| Schweregrad | info |
|---|---|
| Kategorie | Artificial Intelligence |
| Quelle | arXiv cs.CL ↗ |
| Veröffentlicht | 25.08.2026 UTC |
Sicherheitsmeldung mit Schweregrad noch nicht bewertet. Technische Details im Tab „Originaltext“; empfohlene Schritte in der Checkliste.
arXiv:2608.21929v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agent skills extend coding agents with task-specific instructions, scripts, and resources, but they also create a trusted instruction channel that can be abused beyond conventional security attacks. This paper studies token amplification through skill injection: an economic resource-abuse threat in which a malicious skill causes an agent to consume substantially more tokens than needed for normal task execution. We present SkillBloat, a two-phase framework that first screens a library of diverse attack-type conditions across multiple amplification mechanisms and then refines the strongest candidate through LLM-guided full-document skill rewriting. Evaluated on a real-world skill benchmark, SkillBloat achieves 5.4184x-10.1455x average best amplification across multiple coding-agent target configurations. An ablation shows that the second-stage refinement loop consistently improves average best amplification over Phase 1 attack-type screening alone, demonstrating that iterative optimization provides additional benefit beyond initial attack-type selection. These results show that skill ecosystems expose a practical resource-amplification attack surface that is orthogonal to existing security-oriented skill poisoning.
Maßnahmen
⬇ Als MarkdownVerwandte Beiträge
- info Macaron-V1: Towards Open Continual Learning with Self-Improvement and Mixture-of-LoRA
- info A JoLT for the KV cache: Near-lossless KV cache compression via joint Lagrangian allocation of Tucker ranks and a rotated residual for llms
- info SCAR: Semantic Continuity-Aware Retrieval for Efficient Context Expansion in RAG
- info Same Payload, Different Channel: Measuring Trust Asymmetry in Tool-Using Language Models